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United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

or Magistrate Judge		Matthew	F. Kennelly	Sitting Judge if Other than Assigned Judge			
		C 4385	DATE	2/16/	2002		
CASE TITLE			Paschal vs. USA				
мо	TION:	[In the following box (of the motion being p		g the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defe	endant, 3rd party plaintiff, and	d (b) state briefly the nature	
DO	CKET ENTRY:				<u> </u>		
(1)	Filed motion of [use listing in "Motion" box above.]						
(2)	☐ Brief	in support of motion	n due				
(3)	☐ Answ	er brief to motion d	ue Reply to	answer brief due	_•		
(4)	☐ Rulin	g/Hearing on	_ set for at				
(5)	☐ Status	hearing[held/conti	nued to] [set for/re-	set for] on set for	at		
(6)	☐ Pretri	al conference[held/o	continued to] [set fo	or/re-set for] on so	et for at		
(7)	☐ Trial[set for/re-set for] or	ı at				
(8)	☐ [Bend	[Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at					
(9)		This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to] □ FRCP4(m) □ General Rule 21 □ FRCP41(a)(1) □ FRCP41(a)(2).					
(10)	Court grants	defendant's mot	ion to dismiss (1	forth on the attached 3-1) and denies plaint ack of subject matter	iff's motion for leav		
(11)) 🔳 [For f	urther detail see ord	ler attached to the o	riginal minute order.]			
	•	ndvised in open court.				Document Number	
	· ·	No notices required. Notices mailed by judge's staff.			number of notices		
	Notified counsel by telephone.				date docketed	\sim	
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	Mail AO 450 form.			MG 'S'N	docketing deputy initials		
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

LEO PASCHAL,)	
)	
	Plaintiff,)	
)	
vs.)	Case No. 01 C 4385
)	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)	
)	
	Defendant.)	
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER FR 2 5 780

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

Leo Paschal, currently an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution at Oxford, Wisconsin, brought this *pro se* action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §2671 *et seq.* He claims that while he was a pretrial detainee at the Chicago Metropolitan Correctional Center, he slipped and fell while working in the kitchen due to the government's negligence. Defendants have moved to dismiss Paschal's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Paschal alleges that he was held at the MCC while awaiting trial. On April 3, 1999, he volunteered to work in the kitchen. He says that he requested "safety shoes" because of the "consistent wetness of the kitchen floor," but the officer in charge told him he could not obtain the shoes because it was a Saturday. Paschal worked that day without incident. On April 9, Paschal again worked in the kitchen; asked the officer in charge for safety shoes; was unable to obtain them because the clothing room was closed; and completed his work without incident. On April 10, Paschal returned to work, again wearing his own shoes. He was asked to squeegee the wet spots on the floor. While doing this, his shoes became wet, he lost his balance, and he fell. The officer on duty requested medical attention. Two hours later, Paschal was seen by a

physician's assistant who diagnosed with him back and shoulder injuries. Paschal says that has seen numerous doctors for his injuries since that time and claims that he has medical bills, though it is unclear what (if any) part of these was not covered by the Bureau of Prisons. He seeks to recover \$300,000 for his injuries.

Paschal submitted an administrative tort claim to the Bureau of Prisons in July 2000. He did not receive a response within six months and filed the present suit under the FTCA in June 2001. The United States has moved to dismiss, arguing that Paschal's sole remedy is under the Inmate Compensation Act, 18 U.S.C. §4126, and that he cannot bring a claim under the FTCA.

The ICA provides a fund for "paying, under rules and regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, compensation to inmates employed in any industry, or performing outstanding services in institutional operations, and compensation to inmates or their dependents for injuries suffered in any industry or in any work activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institution in which the inmates are confined." 18 U.S.C. §4126(c). The Supreme Court has held that the existence of the remedy provided by the ICA and its governing regulations precludes a claim under the FTCA by a person covered by the ICA's terms. *United States v. Demko*, 385 U.S. 149 (1966). Paschal argues that the ICA applies only to convicted prisoners and not to pretrial detainees, but the regulations promulgated under the statute refer to "pretrial inmate[s]," 28 C.F.R. §301.102(b)(1), indicating that the term is in fact broad enough to cover a pretrial detainee. *See also* 28 C.F.R. §500.100 (holding that Bureau of Prisons policies applicable to convicted persons also apply to pretrial detainees). Thus, because an administrative remedy exists to compensate Paschal for his injuries, his FTCA claim is barred.

Paschal has sought leave to amend his complaint to convert it to a Bivens action, that is, a

Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The ICA does not preclude a Bivens action. Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1997). However, a two year statute of limitations applies to Bivens claims arising in Illinois, see Delgado-Brunet v. Clark, 93 F.3d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 1996), and even if the proposed amendment related back to the

claim brought directly against federal officers under the Constitution on the authority of Bivens v.

date Paschal filed this suit, that would do him no good, as his original complaint was mailed to

the Clerk on June 7, 2001, more than two years after his injury. Because Paschal's putative

Bivens claim would be time-barred, the Court denies him leave to amend.

Finally, in responding to the motion to dismiss, Paschal argued that requiring him to work without safety shoes amounted to involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and that he was wrongfully disciplined for refusing to work without safety shoes. The purported involuntary servitude claim is without merit, as Paschal has conceded that pretrial detainces at the MCC are given jobs only if they volunteer, and that he himself volunteered. The purported wrongful discipline claim is barred because Paschal has failed to allege that he exhausted Bureau of Prisons administrative remedies before trying to bring that claim to court.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants defendant's motion to dismiss [docket item 13-1] and denics plaintiff's motion for leave to amend [item 15-1]. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Date: February 16, 2002

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY United States District Judge